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MURPHY'S LAW: THE PAN AM 
COROLLARY 
By David V. Ainsworth * 
The venerable tension between marine protection and in-
demnity underwriters and marine cargo risk underwriters has in-
creased materially as the result of a 1977 decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pan American 
World Airways, Inc. v. California Stevedore and Ballast Co. 1 (Pan 
Am). This decision is already breeding litigation,2 and there will 
certainly be more to come. Unfortunately, due to a scholastically 
and technically erroneous reading of the case by some members 
of the admiralty bar and bench, it is also causing practical prob-
lems for carriers and cargo interests alike. 
In Pam Am, the defendant stevedore, seeking to invoke the 
"Himalaya" clause3 in Barber Line's bill of lading, attempted to 
limit its liability for $20,785 in damages caused by its negligent 
handling of an aircraft scissors lift to $500 under provisions of the 
United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act4 (COGSA). Although 
the Barber Line bill of lading incorporated COGSA, including the 
$500 package limitation and agreed valuation provision,5 into the 
• J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law, 1972. The author is Senior Counsel 
to American President Lines, Ltd., headquartered in Oakland, California. He is a member 
of the American, California and San Francisco Bar Associations and the Maritime Law 
Association. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. 
1. 559 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
2. See Komatsu, Ltd. v. M.V. Colorado, Nos. C77-737B C78-172B (W.D. Wash., filed 
August 24, 1978); General Elec. Co. v. M.V. Lady Sophie, 458 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
3. A Himalaya clause in an ocean bill of lading is one which extends the carrier's 
benefits and limitations on liability under the transportation agreement to stevedores, 
terminal services contractors and other independent contractors performing under the 
transportation agreement. The name refers to the vessel involved in Adler v. Dickson, 1 
Q.B. 158 (1955). 
4. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976). COGSA, enacted in 1936, contains the United 
States' statutory implementation of a multilateral treaty among maritime nations, viz., 
the Hague Rules of 1921, as amended by the Brussels Convention of 1924. Robert C. Herd 
& Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 301 (1959). 
5. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become 
liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the trans-
portation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package 
lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not 
shipped in packages, per customary freight unit, or the equiva-
lent of that sum in other currency, unless the nature and value 
13 
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clause paramount ex contractu8 in conventional language,7 else-
where, the bill of lading was patently conflicting. 
Clause 18 read: 
The responsibility of the carrier shall in no case, 
whether governed by the U. S. Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act, the Hague Rules, or not, exceed the 
amount of $500 per package or customary freight 
unit. It is agreed that the word "package" shall 
include any container, flat pallet, van, trailer, 
vehicle, animal, pieces and all articles of any de-
scription except goods shipped in bulk.8 
The defendant stevedore argued that, notwithstanding the 
patently contradictory language in Clause 18, the shipper, a com-
mercially sophisticated corporation, should be imputed with 
knowledge of its option to declare the true value of the scissors 
lift before shipment, pay a higher ad valorem freight charge, and 
avoid the COGSA limitation as incorporated by reference 
through the clause paramount. The shipper's failure to so declare 
and pay, it was argued, should be inferred as assent to the agreed 
valuation provision so as to limit the defendant's liability in the 
manner averred. The court of appeals, per curiam, rejected 
this argument, and affirmed the district court's award of full 
damages to the plaintiff. 
of such goods have been declared by the shipper before ship-
ment and inserted in the bill of lading. 
6. By its terms, COGSA's application is limited as a matter of law. It applies only. 
for example, to goods shipped in U.S. foreign, but not domestic, commerce (id. §§ 1300, 
1312); from ship's tackle at loading to ship's tackle at unloading (id. § 1301(e)); to goods 
stowed underdeck (id. § 1301(c)); and to cargoes other than livestock (id.). Ocean trans~ 
portation agreements may extend the application of COGSA's provisions to such excluded 
activities as a matter of contractual agreement (ex contractu) where such provisions do 
not apply by law and of their own force (ex proprio vigore). ([d. § 1312). 
7. The Barber Line clause paramount included the following language: 
This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of 
the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act of the United States of Amer-
ica, approved April 16, 1936, which shall be deemed to be incor-
porated herein, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed 
a surrender by the Carrier of any of its rights or immunities or 
an increase of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said 
Act. 
The defendant contended that this language was intended to extend the provisions of 
COGSA ex contractu to the shipment in question, a domestic trade shipment being 
transported from Alameda, California, to Balboa, Canal Zone. 
8. 559 F.2d at 1175 (emphasis added). 
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A. THE SOURCE 
The Pan Am court concluded its opinion with a paragraph 
containing the following contribution to Murphy's, as well as 
admiralty, law: 
We reject appellant's argument that an experi-
enced shipper should be deemed to have knowl-
edge of an opportunity to secure an alternative 
freight rate, and higher carrier liability, by reason 
of his knowledge of COGSA,. . . made applicable 
by a "Paramount Clause" in the bill of lading, 
where such opportunity does not present itself on 
the face of the bill of lading. 9 
The italicized language can be read as meaning two very 
different things. One reading may be harmonized with apposite 
precedent, makes good sense and is almost certainly what was 
intended. The alternate reading, although bizarre in its applica-
tion, has been given effect in at least two cases which rely on Pan 
Am's ruling. to 
When the Pan Am court stated that the requisite opportun-
ity must be presented "on the face of the bill oflading,"" it surely 
meant "face" in the sense of "expressly," not in the sense of the 
front side as distinct from the reverse side of the document. Con-
struction of the term "face" in the sense of expressly would place 
the decision in Pan Am in accord with the court's prior pro-
nouncement on the validity of an agreed valuation device incor-
porated as a matter of contract into an ocean bill of lading. In 
Tessler Brothers (B. C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 12 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the carrier had established, prima facie, that an 
opportunity to declare valuation and avoid the package limita-
tion was provided if its bill of lading evidencing the transporta-
tion agreement expressly provided that the $500 'package limita-
tion applied "unless the nature of the goods and a valuation 
higher than $500 shall have been declared in writing by the ship-
per upon delivery to the carrier and ... extra freight paid if 
required. "13 
9. [d. at 1177 (emphasis added). 
10. Komatsu, Ltd. v. M.V. Colorado, Nos. C77·737B, C78·172B (W.O. Wash., filed 
August 24, 1978); General Elec. Co. v. M.V. Lady Sophie, 458 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
11. 559 F.2d at 1177. 
12. 494 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1974). 
13. [d. at 443. 
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On the other hand, if the court's reference to "face" is to be 
understood as referring to the front, as opposed to the reverse side 
of the bill of lading, a number of peculiarities appear. First, the 
terms and conditions of an ocean bill of lading are generally set 
forth on the reverse side because the front side, usually printed 
in an internationally standard format, is full. The agreed valua-
tion provision is, by no means, the only provision in a carrier's 
bill of lading, or in COGSA, which has the effect of limiting the 
carrier's liability or even of avoiding it altogether. 14 Yet the Pan 
Am court is believed by some to have singled out the agreed 
valuation provision, without explanation, for a place of intended 
prominence on the front side of the bill of lading. 
Additionally, the Pan Am holding, if so construed, would be 
an unwarranted and wholly gratuitous act of liberality toward 
carriers which author "Catch-22" bill of lading provisions. Such 
a reading would authorize patently conflicting liability-limitation 
provisions, if only the opportunity to declare the value of the 
goods presents itself on the front side of the bill of lading. The 
rules of construing contracts of adhesion favor the opposite read-
ing. 15 
Most significantly, a shipper does not sign or even receive an 
ocean bill of lading before shipment. Ie Ocean bills of lading are 
issued unilaterally by the carrier and furnished to the shipper 
after the goods have been received for shipment. In many, if not 
most, cases, a bill of lading is issued after the vessel has sailed 
with the goods aboard. The ocean bill of lading is said to 
"evidence" the transportation agreement. 17 It is common but not 
universal practice in the industry, for carriers to invite shippers 
to furnish shipping information on carrier supplied shipping doc-
uments. These forms, typically multi-part, may contain a dock 
receipt, United States Customs shipper's export declaration or 
other shipping documents, one of which is sometimes used by the 
carrier as a master for the preparation of its bill of lading. If the 
14. For example, COGSA also contains a one year period of limitations (46 U.S.C. § 
1303(6» and an exculpatory clause from any liability whatever for loss or damage negli-
gently caused by "the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier in the navigation 
or in the management of the ship" (46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a)). 
15. See note 19 infra and accompanying text. 
16. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 19-20 
(2d Cir. 1969). 
17. 46 V.S.C. §§ 1300, 1312 (1976). 
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shipper, or a connecting carrier, freight forwarder or customs 
house broker for the shipper, prepares the initial shipping docu-
ments, the carrier either prepares its bill of lading using the infor-
mation provided by such documentation, or completes any bill of 
lading master form contained in the shipper-supplied shipping 
documents by filling in the transportation charges, on-board 
date, ifrequired, marks, quantity and other required information. 
Thereafter, the carrier issues the bill of lading as required by 
law. 18 
One unfamiliar with industry documentation practices 
might be misled by the language of the provision of COGSA 
under consideration. The $500 package limitation and agreed val-
uation provision applies "unless the nature and value of such 
goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and 
inserted in the bill of lading."" The compounding of verbs in this 
provision is confusing. Although it is clear that the shipper must 
declare the nature and value of the goods before shipment, it is 
not expressly stated that the carrier inserts such provision into 
the bill of lading. It is not clear what, if anything, Congress in-
tended by this misleading mincing of words,20 although the inser-
tion of the declared value by the carrier clearly benefits holders 
of negotiable bills of lading and others having an interest in the 
goods. 
While shippers may avail themselves of any number of meth-
ods to declare to a carrier, before shipment, the true value of their 
cargoes, the bill of lading is not such a method. Any distinction 
between the front and reverse side of the bill of lading, believed 
by some to have been made by the Pan Am court is, therefore, 
wholly meaningless. 
18. [d. § 193 (1976). 
19. [d. § 1305(5) (1976)(emphasis added). 
20. The words of Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit seem appropriate, although 
in a different context: 
Our principal task in this case is to determine what Congress 
would have thought about a subject about which it never 
thought or could have thought and one about which we have 
. never thought nor any other Court has thought. Technology has 
created a maritime transportation system unlike any which was 
in existence in 1936 when Congress enacted COG8A. 
Wirth Ltd. v 8.8. Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1276, rehearing en banc denied, 541 F.2d 
281 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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B. CHOICE OF DOCTRINE 
The choice between the two readings of the court's reference 
to presenting an opportunity to declare valuation "on the face of 
the bill of lading" also offers a choice between established and 
novel doctrine. 
The Pan Am case might have been decided on conventional 
grounds by invoking one of two rules, which the defendant must 
have satisfied before being permitted to take advantage of the 
limitation of liability provision desired. The simplest and most 
preferred is the rule, well settled in admiralty, that ambiguities 
in adhesion contracts of carriage will be construed strictly against 
the carrier which authored them.21 Perhaps the PanAm court had 
this rule in mind when it observed, "[t]he bill oflading is usually 
a boilerplate form drafted by the carrier, and presented for ac-
ceptance as a matter of routine business practice to a relatively 
low-level shipper employee."22 
The alternative basis for the appropriate result in Pan Am 
would have been to find that a lack of knowledge of and assent 
to the valuation provision existed on the part of the shipper before 
the contract was formed, hence, preventing inclusion of the provi-
sion in the contract.23 Provisions limiting a carrier's liability in a 
standardized contract drafted and imposed by the carrier are 
effective against the shipper, who has the opportunity to adhere 
to or reject them, only if the provisions give clear notification of 
such limitations to the shipper.24 
A non-admiralty court which has correctly analyzed the issue 
illustrates the general rule. In Bauer v. Jackson,25 a shipper's 
horses were loaded on a carrier's departing truck at a prearranged 
time. Although the carrier's bill of lading, under rules applicable 
21. See generally Tessler Bros. Ltd. v. Itlllpllcific Line, 494 F.2d 438, 445 n.11 (9th 
Cir. 1974); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S. S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d 
Cir. 1969). See also, 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559 (1960). 
22. 559 F.2d at 1177. 
23. See New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Nothnage, 346 U.S. 128, 135, 
(1953), Port of Tacoma v. 8.8. Duval, 364 F.2d 615, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1966); Pacific 8.S. 
Co. v. Cackette, 8 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925); City of Nome v. Alaska S.S. Co., 321 F. 8upp. 
1063 (D. Alas. 1971). See also C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 13 Dec. Fed. 
Mar. Comm'n 76 (FMC 1969). 
24. Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1967); Bauer 
v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 370, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971). 
25. 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971). 
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to land carriers, contained an agreed valuation provision, this 
clause was not discussed with the shipper's representative, who 
signed the bill of lading, but was not given a copy. The evidence 
implied that the shipper's representative believed the document 
to be a receipt for the horses. In reversing the trial court's ruling 
that the shipping contract effectively limited the carrier's liabil-
ity as a matter of law, the court of appeals, citing Chandler u. 
Aero Mayflower Transit CO.28 stated: 
In analyzing the meaning of the statutory phrase, 
"value declared in writing. . . or agreed upon in 
writing ... ," as used in section 20(11) of the In-
terstate Commerce Act, the court stated: 
"Congress no doubt used these words to indicate 
that a shipper should agree in the same sense that 
one agrees or assents to enter into a contractual 
obligation. And such assent is effective only if 
given after a fair opportunity to choose between 
higher or lower liability by paying a correspond-
ingly greater or lesser charge .... "27 
The plain focus of the quoted language is on whether the 
shipper had actual knowledge of the provision and received an 
opportunity to exercise the option provided by it. Whether or not 
such knowledge and opportunity existed is a question of fact. 
If the Pan Am court did base its decision partially upon the 
rules of construction of adhesion contracts, it failed to say so. If 
it based its decision on the carrier's failure to meet its burden of 
proving, according to the applicable evidentiary standard, that 
the opportunity in question had been given to the shipper, again, 
it failed to clearly state this conclusion. 
Instead, the court held that "where such opportunity does 
not present itself on the face of the bill of lading" knowledge of 
the agreed valuation provisions will not be imputed to the ship-
per. Anyone interpreting this language to refer to the front side 
of the bill of lading would have to conclude that providing a space 
or other "opportunity" to declare valuation on the front side of 
the bill of lading would meet the carrier's burden of proof. Thus 
the carrier's burden would be met even if the terms and condi-
tions of the bill of lading, as in Pan Am, were patently contradic-
26. 374 F.2d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1967). 
27. 15 Cal. App. 3d at 368, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citations omitted). 
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tory. Such an act of liberality toward carriers in derogation of the 
general rule of construction of bills of lading as adhesion contracts 
is implausible. . 
The trial court's holding in Pan Am, and what should be read 
as the court of appeals' intended holding in that case, was: 
In the instant case, however, the limitation in 
Clause 18, which does not provide any opportun-
ity for the shipper to declare higher value, . . .. is 
so inconsistent with 46 U.S.C.A. [section] 
1304(5) as to: (1) render the bill of lading provi-
sion null and void; (2) distinguish the instant ac-
tion from Tessler Bros.; and (3) place on defen-
dant the burden of proving that an opportunity 
did in fact exist for the shipper to avoid the limita-
tion.28 
The Pan Am court's distinguishing of Tessler Brothers is 
important. In that case, the Ninth Circuit declared that the car-
rier had established, prima facie, that an opportunity to declare 
valuation and avoid the limitation was provided if its bill of lad-
ing evidencing the transportation agreement expressly provided 
for the declared valuation option contained in COGSA.29 
Thus, the parameters of the problem have been established, 
at least insofar as the Pan Am case is concerned. If the bill of 
lading expressly and substantially tracks the COGSA agreed val-
uation provision language, the limitation of liability applicable ex 
contractu will be enforced, absent proof rebutting the prima facie 
case that a fair opportunity to avoid it had been provided.30 
Where, however, the bill of lading does not contain such language 
and is patently contradictory on whether or not the shipper has 
the required opportunity, the limitation will not be enforced ab-
sent rebuttal evidence that the shipper did have a fair opportun-
ity to avoid it. 
C. SPECIFIC MISCHIEF 
Apart from the fact that some readers of the Pan Am court's 
28. 559 F.2d at 1176. 
29. 494 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1974); see note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
30. The author does not believe that the Tessler-approved language should be the 
minimum standard necessary to make the agreed valuation provision operative. Clear 
incorporation-by-reference language should be enough. Nevertheless. the Ninth Circuit 
has declared that Tessler language will provide immunity from the Pan Am result. 
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problematic language are not sufficiently among shipping indus-
try cognoscenti to know that shippers neither declare nor insert 
anything on the bill of lading evidencing the transportation agree-
ment, and apart from the doubtful doctrine resulting from a mis-
taken reading of Pan Am, does the holding do any real mischief? 
It does. 
Shippers Needlessly Prejudiced 
Using the Pan Am decision as a springboard, it is now being 
argued that absent an express provision setting forth the ship-
per's option as approved in Tessler, it is necessary to insert a 
"spot" or "space"3\ on the front side of the bill of lading. A strong 
implication arises from such a contention, however, that, having 
done so, a carrier establishes, prima facie, that the required op-
portunity has been provided. This would apparently be true not-
withstanding ambiguous or patently contradictory language else-
where in the bill of lading on the subject of limitation of liability, 
as, for example, in Pan Am, and notwithstanding the fact that 
no opportunity actually existed, as in Bauer v. Jackson. 32 It is 
apparently not even necessary to set forth the shipper's option in 
Tessler-sanctioned language. It would be enough to merely pro-
vide an opportunity to declare valuation by insertion of a "space" 
or a "spot" on the front side of the bill of lading. Yet, as we have 
seen, the placing of such provisions on the front side of an ocean 
bill of lading is the one method by which such knowledge may not 
be gained and the opportunity to act will not be afforded beforE! 
shipment. What difficulties may arise in the future for cargo in-
terests over this aspect of the popular misreading of the Pan Am 
holding is as yet, unknown. 
Carriers Needlessly Prejudiced 
Whether intended by the Pan Am court or not, some practi-
tioners for both carriers and cargo interests are reading Pan Am 
as declaring that the form of marine transportation agreements 
of all common carriers by water in United States interstate and 
foreign commerce must conform to the Ninth Circuit's notions on 
bill of lading format design. Failure to do so, it is feared, may in 
any instance result in frustration of the agreed valuation provi-
sion of the Hague Rules as promulgated by United States 
31. General Elec. Co. v. M.V. Lady Sophie, 458 F. Supp. 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
32. See notes 25 to 27 supra and accompanying text. 
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COGSA. Thus, carriers are being advised to reprint their bills of 
lading in conformity with what is perceived to be the Pan Am 
design. Such advice is not without foundation. 
In General Electric Co. v. M. V. Lady Sophie,33 the carrier's 
bill of lading provision which stated, ex contractu, "that the. 
Hague Rules as enacted in the country of shipment shall apply 
to the contract" was held to be insufficient notice of the shipper's 
option to declare value and pay a higher freight charge as pro-
vided by COGSA.34 The Lady Sophie court first reasoned that the 
carrier's bill of lading which incorporated by reference only the 
"Hague Rules as enacted in the country of shipment" simply did 
not raise an inference of the shipper's knowledge of the agreed 
valuation provision and opportunity to avoid it. The court, bor-
rowing from Pan Am, then added, "[t]he next infirmity in the 
carrier's bill of lading is the absence of a designated spot for a 
shipper to insert the declared value of the goods."35 Thus, the red 
herring dragged across the trail by Pan Am received a further 
airing by the Lady Sophie court. 
Unless the carrier has obediently, if pointlessly, placed a 
declared value "spot" on the ocean bill of lading, any carrier 
which has incorporated the Hague Rules by reference without 
tracking the language of section 1304(5) now risks having the 
agreed valuation provision of a longstanding multilateral treaty 
among maritime nations turned aside by United States admiralty 
courts, with whatever violence to the structure of its freight rates 
results. Lord Diplock has expressed a point of view which recog-
nizes the commercial realities in these matters: "Any proposal to 
solve the anomaly arising from the package limitation in the 
Hague Rules . . . will be based on the practical economies of 
insurance and not on any high moral grounds."38 He continues, 
"it is more practical and economical from the point of view of 
insurance to spread the risk to the cargo in excess of a fixed limit 
among a number of cargo insurers rather than to concentrate it 
in the carrier's [protection and indemnity] insurer. "37 
33. 458 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
34. Id. at 621. 
35. [d. at 622. 
36. Dip\ock, Conventions and Morals - Limitation Clauses in International Maritime 
Conventions, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 536 (1970). 
37. Id. at 528-29. 
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The Constructive Notice Issue 
The issue in the Pan Am case was the conventional contract 
question whether the contracting parties had achieved a meeting 
of the minds over the agreed valuation provision. It should be 
remembered that even this issue does not arise where COGSA 
applies ex proprio vigore. 38 To the extent, however, that the trans-
portation agreement evidenced by the bill of lading or other ship-
ping document incorporates COGSA ex contractu, the issue does 
arise. 
The mutual assent issue is a question of whether the shipper, 
under the facts, knew or should have known of and assented to 
the agreed valuation provision. If so, the shipper is bound. If not, 
the carrier may not limit its liability in accordance with the disal-
lowed provision. 
Maritime regulation, however, raises the additional issue of 
constructive notice. To what extent should shippers and con-
signees be conclusively bound by provisions incorporating 
COGSA ex contractu by reason of their publication in tariff form 
and filing with the Federal Maritime Commission under the ship-
ping laws?39 Such publication, at least of provisions limiting the 
carrier's liability as opposed to those specifying rates and other 
matters required to be in every tariff, will not conclusively bind 
cargo interests in the absence of actual knowledge.·o However, 
nonenforcement of the agreed valuation provision of a .tariff-
published transportation agreement can directly cause the'ind of 
discriminatory application of rates which is anathema to mari-
time regulation. A shipper that desires full carrier liability may 
declare its desires in good faith by some timely, operative method 
38. In an unreported case consolidated with another case pending before the Western 
District of Washington, a contrary ruling has been issued, incorrectly in the author's view. 
In Komatsu, Ltd. v. M. V. Colorado, No. C77-737B (D. Wash., filed August 24,1978), the 
court granted the shipper's motion for summary judgment striking the defendant carrier's 
and co-defendant stevedore's package limitation defense. COGSA applied as a matter of 
law to the cargo in question. With respect to the stevedore, the court did not find the 
Himalaya clause inapplicable or even discuss this issue. Asserting that it was bound by 
Pan Am, the court declared, inexplicably, that the package limitation provision of 
COGSA did not apply. Unlike the Pan Am case, where COGSA's application was sought 
ex contractu, there was no patent conflict in the carrier's bill of lading and COGSA 
applied of its own force. The court's order illustrates the "Murphyesque" effects of Pan 
Am on the admiralty trial courts. 
39. The Shipping Act of 1916, § 18, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1976); 1933 Inter-
coastal Shipping Act, 1933, § 2, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 844 (1976). 
40. See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
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(not, however, on the front of the bill of lading), and pay the ad 
valorem freight charge on the excess valuation. That shipper is 
penalized in comparison with the litigious shipper that remains 
silent, accepts the lower freight charge and then successfully 
challenges the enforceability of section 1304(5) of COOSA incor-
porated by reference ex contractu. Because of this potential for 
direct, discriminatory rate treatment of shippers where the 
agreed valuation provision of COGSA is disallowed, this provision 
seems to clearly fall under that category of rate provisions re-
quired to be published in every tariff under the shipping laws. 
The shipping public's interest in freedom from discrimina-
tory rate treatment by common carriers demands that an admi-
ralty court considering the enforceability of an agreed valuation 
provision require evidence and rule on the issue of whether avoid-
ance of the provision would result in unlawful discrimination 
among shippers. The Pan Am court did not even discuss the 
constructive knowledge issue or its regulatory ramifications. 
The Short Form Problem 
Lastly, the Pan Am case has been observed to be an impedi-
ment to progress in ocean transportation documentation. Short. 
form bills of lading are playing an increasingly important role in 
ocean transportation. A short form shipping document or bill of 
lading incorporates by reference the regular form terms and con-
ditions of the transportation agreement, rather than setting them 
forth at length. In the domestic trades, the wide use of short forms 
is protected by statute.41 In the United States foreign trades, 
while short form shipping documents have not been widely used 
as a matter of carrier convenience, a need has developed for such 
documents for the shipper's convenience. 
Shippers that have a recurring need for ocean transportation 
services to or from the United States request carriers to issue the 
shipper's own form of shipping document produced by a machine 
system. Such a document can be transmitted by courier or mod-
em telecommunications to the destination country so that neces-
sary commercial functions can be performed in preparation for 
the anticipated arrival of the goods on vessels and intermodal 
transportation systems, which shorten transit times as the result 
of advancing technology. A shipper's commercial needs are thus 
41. 46 U.S.C. § 844 (1975). 
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aided if the carrier will accept the shipper's form of shipping 
document as its master document for issuing the bill of lading, 
"waybill"42 or other shipping document evidencing the transpor-
tation agreement. 
How does the Pan Am case tend to frustrate such progress? 
It does so by calling into question the effectiveness of the incor-
poration-by-reference mechanism. In order for the new, shipper-
desired short form shipping document to be used, the only text 
on the form making reference to the terms and conditions of 
carriage must be a brief statement incorporating by reference the 
carrier's regular form terms and conditions as published in the 
carrier's tariff. The form would be used with any carrier whose 
services were used by that shipper. 
Although in Pan Am the failure of incorporation by reference 
of the agreed valuation provision of COGSA, can and should be 
explained in terms of the patent conflict in the Barber Line's bill 
of lading, Pan Am's progeny do direct violence to the effective-
ness of provisions incorporated by reference into a contract of 
carriage. In Lady Sophie, the incorporation by reference of the 
Hague Rules was ineffective in the absence of a designated "spot" 
for a shipper to insert the declared value of the goods,43 In 
Komatsu, the court ruled that, in the absence of Tessler's magic 
language or a "space" for an excess valuation declaration, "the 
incorporation of COGSA provisions [are rendered] ineffective."H 
The plain implication of these cases, then, is that carriers 
should protect their rate structures by printing either the Tessler-
sanctioned language or general incorporation-by-reference lan-
guage coupled with a "space" or "spot" on the front of their 
documents which evidence the transportation agreement. Nei-
ther of these possibilities is presented when a shipper-prepared 
short form shipping document is used,4& 
42. Williams, Waybills and Short Form Documents: A Lawyer's View:LLOYD's MAR. 
& COM. L.Q. (Aug. 1979). 
43. 458 F. Supp. at 622. It remains to be seen what, if any, surprises are in store for 
carriers and underwriters that believe that the York-Antwerp Rules, 1974, incorporated 
by reference into virtually all contracts of carriage, are effective. 
44. No. C77-737B (D. Wash., filed August 24, 1978). 
45. It is beyond the realm of commercial reality to ask shippers all over the world to 
conform to the vicissitudes of United States courts. 
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Although it can be persuasively argued that the Pan Am 
result should not occur in cargo cases brought by a shipper whose 
own short form shipping document was used as evidence of the 
transportation agreement, this argument is, at best, uncertain. 
With respect to claims brought by the consignee or a purchaser 
of a negotiable shipping document, the argument becomes much 
less certain. Given that uncertainty is unacceptable to preventive 
law practitioners, the inhibition against using shipper-prepared 
short form shipping documents in place of the carrier's regular 
form bill of lading remains as a pointless court-created clog on 
progressive documentation practices. This situation will continue 
to exist until the alternative reading of Pan Am, as requiring 
some form of declared valuation provision on the front side of the 
document evidencing the transportation agreement, is negated by 
the Ninth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court. 
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